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Endogenous agenda formation processes
with the one-deviation property
Hannu Vartiainen
Helskinki Center of Economic Research, University of Helsinki
We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each
stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning
coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevail-
ing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a one-time deviation restric-
tion on the feasible policy processes, reflecting the farsightedness of voters. The
key feature of the solution is history dependence. The existence of the solution
is proven by iterating a version of the uncovered set. We show that the resulting
fixed point is the largest set of outcomes that can be implemented via any policy
process that meets the one-deviation restriction. Finally, we relate our solution
to a concrete noncooperative model and show that it can be interpreted as a re-
finement of the solution of Bernheim and Slavov (2009) in the context of repeated
voting, and of the solution of Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011) in the
context of coalition formation.
Keywords. Voting, history dependence, one-deviation principle, covering.
JEL classification. C71, C72.
1. Introduction
Endogenous agenda setting is an important and difficult question in political choice
theory. For example, the famous chaos theorems (McKelvey 1979, Rubinstein 1979, Bell
1981, Schofield 1983) state that with very relaxed conditions concerning how voters are
distributed in the policy space, an agenda can be created where it is possible to start at
any status quo alternative, and with a succession of majority comparisons, end at any
other specified alternative in the policy space. Hence, without a presumed institutional
structure, there seems to be only little hope of reaching any predictions of the actual
political choice.
Lack of farsightedness of agents is a well known limitation of the chaos argument,
however. With the agenda amendment procedure studied by McKelvey and others, it is
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the outcome in the end of the dominance chain—not the next one in line—that should
be used for payoff comparisons. Hence, not all the dominance chains described by
the chaos argument are really feasible.1 But this observation raises a difficult question,
known in the coalition formation literature as the prediction problem (see Ray 2007):
profitability of a blocking depends on which one of the feasible dominance paths is to
be played. That is, one needs to have a theory that simultaneously explains which out-
comes are blocked and where the play converges via transitory blockings. Clearly, the
transitory blockings should also reflect, in an appropriate sense, coalitional optimality.
A natural research strategy is to add forward looking strategic thinking into the
model or to model the whole decision making procedure as a concrete noncoopera-
tive game.2 But since the problem is open ended—there is no final stage from which to
start the recursion—it is not clear how it should be solved in general contexts. How to
find a consistent, applicable, and powerful solution that also exists in a general class of
collective choice situations is an open question.
This paper develops a solution of farsighted and endogenous political choice that is
based on the standard one-deviation property. Our solution builds on a general model
of coalition formation owing to Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011), and on a
model of sequential political choice owing to Bernheim and Slavov (2009). The benefit
of our solution is that it is simple and parsimonious, and relates in a natural way to
the usual principles of dynamic optimization. It is also more robust, has more cutting
power, and requires less information on the part of the modeler than the solutions on
which it builds. Importantly, our solution exists under very relaxed conditions.
Bernheim and Slavov (2009) study a policy program that specifies an infinite stream
of social states and is robust against one-time deviations by any majority coalition. The
problem is that their solution is not applicable in the classic one-time decision scenario.
It is critical for their results that society cannot commit to the status quo or “implement”
it. In contrast, the general model of Konishi and Ray (2003) is also well suited to the anal-
ysis of one-time decision making, as demonstrated in Vartiainen (2011). However, the
solution of Konishi and Ray (2003) is less demanding than that of Bernheim and Slavov
(2009) in the sense that, at each instant of time, the coalitional act must be efficient only
for a single coalition, given the continuation play. This is not an unproblematic assump-
tion.3 Why would the other coalitions stay passive when one coalition takes the game to
a direction that is undesirable to them? Ideally, an institution-free model would not be
sensitive to such ad hoc restrictions on coalitional behavior.
We show that the strengths of Konishi and Ray (2003), Bernheim and Slavov (2009),
and Vartiainen (2011) can be combined to obtain a robust prediction of endogenous
and farsighted political choice. Specifically, we study the canonical model of McKelvey
(1979) and others, where a social outcome is implemented once and for all through
an endogenous amendment agenda. At each stage, there is a status quo that may be
1See Chwe (1994).
2For recent contributions, see Acemoglu et al. (2012), Anesi (2006, 2010, 2012), Anesi and Seidmann
(forthcoming), Duggan and Banks (2008), Diermeier and Fong (2012), Dutta et al. (2001, 2002, 2004),
Duggan (2006), Penn (2006, 2009), Roberts (2007), and Bernheim and Slavov (2009).
3See Konishi and Ray (2003, Appendix A) and Xue (1998).
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challenged with another social alternative. The choice between the two is made by ma-
jority voting, and the winner becomes the new status quo. The process continues un-
til the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. Our solution concept—the one-
deviation property—is a strengthened version of the solution of Konishi and Ray (2003)
and Vartiainen (2011), requiring that, for each history of blocked status quos, the pre-
scribed political act is optimal for all the majority coalitions in light of the eventual
consequences of the acts.4 In contrast to Bernheim and Slavov (2009), an outcome is
implemented once and for all if a majority does not challenge it.
An attractive feature of the model studied in this paper is that it is detail-free. As
robustness is required against all feasible coalitional moves, no knowledge is needed
of which coalition has the chance to make a move or even what are the identities of
the coalitions that have acted in the past. In this sense, the model is quite different
from Vartiainen (2011), which explicitly relies on such information. As a consequence,
the current model provides a more robust prediction of endogenous political choice. It
also has strictly more cutting power, as we show with an example. The third aspect in
which the current model is stronger is the domain assumption: we allow all compact
spaces whereas Vartiainen (2011) critically hinges on the finiteness of the set of social
alternatives.5
Moreover, our solution imposes more constraints on behavior than Bernheim and
Slavov (2009) since, in our model, the value of the future play cannot be lower than that
of the current status quo for any of the majority coalition. Consequently, our solution
has more cutting power, as we show with an example.
Our focus is on policy programs that implement an outcome in finite time after all
histories. Such terminating policy programs that satisfy the one-deviation property, or
equilibrium policy programs for short, are characterized directly in terms of the out-
comes they implement and the underlying social preferences. This characterization is
complete in the sense that we identify a consistency property that is met by any set of so-
cial alternatives that are implementable via an equilibrium policy program. Conversely,
we show that any such set of alternatives can be implemented via some equilibrium
policy program.
The main contribution of this paper is a general existence result. The conditions
under which the existence of the solution is proven encompass, for instance, the spatial
model of electoral decision making. The result uses a novel covering technique, which
we dub quasi-covering. We show that the iterated version of the quasi-uncovered set,
the ultimate quasi-uncovered set, satisfies the desired consistency property.6 Moreover,
the ultimate quasi-uncovered set contains all sets with this property.
History dependence of the policy program is crucial to the results of this paper, par-
ticularly for the existence. History dependence is also the key aspect that differenti-
ates our model from most of the literature on endogenous political choice.7  Anesi and
4Ray and Vohra (1997) are among the first to study coalitional behavior by using equilibrium reasoning.
5The focus of Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011) is on the general coalitional model due to
Chwe (1994).
6The uncovered set is due to Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1980). The ultimate uncovered set is studied by
Dutta (1988).
7Bernheim and Slavov (2009) is a notable exception.
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Seidmann (forthcoming) and Anesi (2006, 2010, 2012) study agenda formation in related
bargaining models where, at each date, the current status quo is voted against an out-
come proposed by an agent, and the winner becomes the new status quo on the next
date. Their general finding is that the absorbing states of Markov perfect equilibria are
characterized by von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets independently of the
way the proposing player is recognized (see also Diermeier and Fong 2012, Acemoglu
et al. 2012). This is in line with our observation that any history independent policy
program constitutes a vNM stable set (with respect to the underlying social preference
relation). Thus the vNM solution captures the essential features of history independent
collective choice behavior when the choice can be freely amended.8 This is an important
observation, as the vNM stable set, which is a solution with pedigree, has been lacking
a proper noncooperative foundation. The caveat is that a vNM solution may not exist.
General existence requires history dependence, which is the theme of this paper.
Even though our policy programs are history dependent, the relevant part of his-
tories concerns only the past status quos, not the identities of the coalitions that in-
duced the status quos. This is important, as now the solution does not hinge on the
specifics of the institutional structure, for example, which coalition is allowed to chal-
lenge the status quo if there are many that are willing to or what the preferences are of
the agents in a coalition. This informational flexibility also permits secret voting ballots,
which are often used in real applications. Moreover, the results of Anesi and Seidmann
(forthcoming) suggest that our solution could be of use in analyzing history dependent
equilibria of noncooperative agenda setting games more generally.9 Along these lines,
we show that there is an equivalence between equilibrium policy processes and strong
subgame perfect equilibria of a game where agenda proposals at each stage are made
via plurality voting.
An important benefit of “detail-freeness” is that our solution can be expressed in re-
duced form by appealing only to the underlying majority relation. Because of this prop-
erty, it is easy to relate our model to other solutions in the social choice literature. For
example, we show that the ultimate quasi-uncovered set—the maximal set of outcomes
implementable via our solution—is always a subset of the ultimate (deep) uncovered set
(Duggan 2013). However, if the latter happens to be also externally stable, then the two
concepts coincide. In fact, any covering set (Dutta 1988) is shown to satisfy the desired
consistency property.
As a side product, this paper also adds to the literature on uncovered sets and their
derivatives in general domains, an issue that has received attention recently (e.g., Penn
2006, Duggan 2013, Dutta et al. 2005). For example, it has been viewed problematic that
the uncovered set and its iterations may lack external stability. Without external stability,
how can one guarantee that the play eventually converges back to the uncovered set
8Anesi and Seidmann (forthcoming) also analyze comparative static properties of Markov perfect equi-
libria of an agenda amendment game. They find that the eventually implemented outcome may heavily
depend on the details of the protocol, but the set of implementable outcomes is determined by the primi-
tives, i.e., social preferences. This also applies to our model.
9That is, subgame perfect Nash equilibria of agenda setting games that are not sensitive to the recogni-
tion rule.
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(or its iteration) once it departs from this set? The benefit of our approach is that we
describe political choices also at off-equilibrium histories. Indeed our result implies
that a deviation from the ultimate quasi-uncovered set leads back to the set in a way
that makes the original deviation unprofitable, even if the set does not satisfy external
stability.
Hence the ultimate quasi-uncovered set characterizes precisely the equilibrium out-
comes of this game. As the ultimate quasi-uncovered set is a subset of the (deep) un-
covered set and its iterations, our results refine the conventional wisdom that under a
variety of institutional settings, it is the uncovered set that describes the outcomes that
can be implemented (Miller 1980, Shepsle and Weingast 1984, Banks 1985).
Duggan (2006) provides a general existence result for a game of endogenous agenda
formation in which the agenda is formed by an ex ante known finite sequence of pro-
posers. The constructed agenda is then voted on. Dutta et al. (2002, see also 2001, 2004)
consider endogenous agendas in a less structured setting, imposing only consistency
conditions on the outcomes of the process. Importantly, also they assume a bounded
maximum length of the resulting agenda that again permits iterating the solution back-
ward. Penn (2008) studies an unbounded proposal process, where players stop amend-
ing the agenda only when the constructed agenda is stable against changes, given the
forthcoming voting under the agenda. Also she finds that in the divide-the-dollar setup,
the set of feasible outcomes is a subset of the vNM stable set associated to the problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and defines the
solution concept. In Section 3, the solutions is characterized. Section 4 derives the ex-
istence result. Section 5 provides a noncooperative interpretation for the model and
in Section 6, a precise connection to the models of Konishi and Ray (2003), Vartiainen
(2011), and Bernheim and Slavov (2009) is demonstrated. Section 7 concludes with
discussion.
2. The setup
There is a nonempty set of social alternatives X . We assume that X is a compact topo-
logical space.
Social preferences over X are summarized by a binary relation R ⊆ X ×X . Denote
the asymmetric part of R by P ⊂X ×X . Then P is the dual of R in the sense that x P y if
and only if not y R x.
We assume that R is a closed subset of X ×X and is complete, i.e., xR y and/or y R x
for all x y ∈X .10 Equivalently, P is an open subset of X×X such that not xP y and y P x
for all x y ∈X .
The above assumptions hold in the remainder of the paper without further notice.
They are the only assumptions we impose on the domain or on the social preferences.
Denote the upper section and the strict upper section of R at x, respectively, by
R(x) = {y ∈ X :y R x} and P(x) = {y ∈ X :y P x}. The lower section of R at x is then
denoted by R−1(x) = {y ∈ X :x R y}. By the closed graph theorem, R(·) and R−1(·)
10We use the standard notation xR y for (x y) ∈R.
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are upper-hemicontinuous correspondences, and by the open graph theorem, P(·) is
a lower-hemicontinuous correspondence. These continuity notions are needed in Sec-
tion 4, when we prove the existence of the solution.
Policy program
A path is a finite sequence x¯ = (x0     xK) of outcomes. Denote the final element of a
path (x0     xK) by
μ[(x0     xK)] = xK
Denote the set of paths, i.e., histories, by H =⋃∞k=0Xk, with ∅ as the initial history. Us-
ing the terminology of Bernheim and Slavov (2009), a policy program σ specifies a social
action given the history of past actions σ :H →X ∪ {STOP}. Since σ is conditioned on all
the histories, we may typically use a shorthand notation σ(hxt) for σ(x0     xt), where
h= (x0     xt−1). The interpretation of a policy program is that if σ(hx)= y ∈X , then
after a history h of status quos, the current status quo x is successfully challenged by a
winning coalition (e.g., majority) with outcome y, which then becomes the new status
quo, and if σ(hx)= STOP, then all the winning coalitions agree on implementing x and
this action is put in force. Thus, a policy program specifies how the sequence of status
quos evolves and which outcome—if any—eventually is implemented.
Denote, in the usual way, by σt(h) the tth iteration of σ starting from h, i.e., σ0(h)=
σ(h) and σt(h) = σ(hσ0(h)    σt−1(h)) for all t = 1    . A policy program σ is ter-
minating if, for any h ∈ H, there is T < ∞ such that σT+1(h) = STOP (T may depend
on h). That is, after history h, the policy program will eventually implement the outcome
σT (h).
Our focus is on terminating policy programs. That is, at the outset, we preclude
complex dynamics such as infinite cycling. Terminating programs are easy to interpret
if the political process concerns a one-shot policy decision. With a terminating pro-
gram, political actions could reflect negotiation prior to a binding one-shot agreement.
Terminating programs are also easier to describe and compute.
We note that requiring that an agreement be achieved in finite time reduces the flex-
ibility of the political process. In general, this makes it harder—not easier—to find a
solution that meets the desired stability properties.11
Let σ¯(h) denote the sequence of status quos in X that is induced by the program σ
from the history h onward:
σ¯(h)= (σ0(h)σ1(h)   )
If σ is terminating, then σ¯(h) is finitely long and μ[σ¯(h)] is well defined for all h. Specif-
ically, for a terminating policy program σ , if a policy action a ∈ X ∪ {STOP} is chosen at
11Any terminating policy program that is robust against one-time deviations after all histories is, in gen-
eral, robust against such deviations. even if infinite cycling is allowed. However, then there may also be
nonterminating programs that meet the one-deviation criterion. Thus, finding a solution might become
easier, but, at the same time, characterizing them could become more difficult.
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history (hx) ∈H, then
μ[σ¯(hxa)] =
{
μ[σ¯(hx y)] if a= y ∈X
x if a= STOP.
In particular, μ[σ¯(hσ(h))] = μ[σ¯(h)].
The solution
Our equilibrium condition, which is just a version of the standard one-deviation princi-
ple, is defined next.
Definition 1 (One-deviation property). A history dependent terminating policy pro-
gram σ satisfies the one-deviation property if
μ[σ¯(h)]Rμ[σ¯(ha)] for all a ∈X ∪ {STOP} for all h ∈H (1)
That is, after each history, a majority will not want to change the prescribed action
given the eventual consequences. Since the program is terminating, the consequences
are always well defined. It is important that the no profitable one-time deviations re-
quirement is also imposed on off-equilibrium histories. Whereas the final deviation of
any finitely long deviation sequence also violates the one-deviation property, the prop-
erty also implies robustness against all finitely long deviations.
This solution is connected to the dynamic Condorcet winner solution of Bernheim
and Slavov (2009) and the dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation due to
Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011). A closer comparison with these concepts
is relegated to Section 6.
Implementable outcomes and Condorcet consistency
Note that a majority coalition can always guarantee the status quo x by choosing stop.
Therefore, the one-deviation property implies that
μ[σ¯(hx)]Rx for all (hx) ∈H (2)
That is, the outcome that is implemented if the equilibrium path is followed must not
be majority dominated by any element along the path.
We say that the set Y of alternatives is implementable via a dynamic policy program
σ if
Y = {x ∈X :σ(hx)= STOP for some h ∈H}
That is, for each element x of Y , there is a history (hx) such that x is implemented.
What the initial status quo is may affect the alternative that will be implemented in Y ,
but not the set Y itself. The sets of implementable outcomes are the main object of our
study.
Before going to the main results of the paper, we observe that our solution passes
the test of being Condorcet consistent. An outcome x is a Condorcet winner if x R y for
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all outcomes y. It is a strong Condorcet winner if x P y for all outcomes y = x. It is not
difficult to see the following extensions:
(a) If z is a Condorcet winner, then there is a terminating policy program σ that meets
the one-deviation property such that z is implementable via σ .
(b) If z is a strong Condorcet winner, then z is the only outcome that is implementable
via any terminating policy program σ that meets the one-deviation property.
3. Characterization
In this section, we characterize terminating policy programs that meet the one-
deviation property. The characterization is given directly in terms of outcomes that
are implementable via such policy programs. With this purpose in mind, we define the
following solution concept for social choice problems.
Definition 2 (Consistent choice set). A nonempty set C ⊆ X is a consistent choice set
if, for any x ∈ C and for any y ∈X , there is z ∈ C such that z ∈R(y) \ P(x).
The definition of a consistent choice set can be rephrased in the form of the familiar
two-step principle. If x is in C, then for any other outcome y, there is another outcome
z—possibly x itself—in C such that xRzRy. Hence, any element x in the set is reachable
from any other element y with at most two dominance steps such that the intermediate
step, z, is also in the set. The difference between this concept and the notion of deep
uncovered set (see Duggan 2013) is that the latter allows the intermediate step z to be
any element in X . Hence the notion of a consistent choice set is more stringent and its
existence is not implied by the existence of the deep uncovered set. Moreover, there may
be many consistent choice sets.
Now we characterize terminating policy programs that meet the one-deviation prop-
erty through the concept of a consistent choice set.
Lemma 3. Let a terminating policy program σ satisfy the one-deviation property. Then
the set Y of outcomes that are implementable via σ is a consistent choice set.
Proof. We show that Y satisfies Definition 2. Take any (hx) ∈ H such that σ(hx) =
STOP. Then μ[σ¯(hx)] = x ∈ Y . Take any y ∈X and let z = μ[σ¯(hx y)] ∈ Y . By (2), z Ry,
or z ∈R(y). By Definition 1, xR z or z /∈ P(x), as desired. 
We now show that the converse of this result holds too. Let C be a consistent choice
set. Our task is to construct a terminating policy program σC :H →X in such a way that
σC meets the one-deviation property and implements the outcomes in C. To this end,
construct a function z :X ×X →X such that, for any x ∈ C and for any y ∈X ,
z(x y) ∈ C ∩R(y) \ P(x) (3)
By Definition 2, C ∩R(y) \ P(x) is nonempty and hence z(x y) is well defined.
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Interpret C as an index set and construct recursively a partitioning {Hx}x∈C of H as
follows. Initial step: Choose x0 ∈ C and ∅ ∈Hx0 . Inductive step: If h ∈Hx, then, for any
y ∈X , let
(h y) ∈
{
Hy if y ∈ C \ P(x)
Hz(xy) if y /∈ C \ P(x). (4)
By induction, each history h becomes allocated to exactly one element of {Hx}x∈C .
An element of the partition {Hx}x∈C is called a phase. The role of a phase is to in-
dicate how the policy program reacts to the status quo. Given the function z and the
collection phases {Hx}x∈C , let the policy program σC satisfy, for all h ∈Hx,
σC(h y)=
{
STOP if y ∈ C \ P(x)
z(x y) if y /∈ C \ P(x). (5)
We now give a verbal interpretation of the constructed policy program σC . Think
of R as the majority relation. The policy program is constructed so that it implements
any element in C and such that any deviating majority coalition will be punished. The
punishment is achieved by implementing an outcome in C that the deviating coalition
does not prefer relative to the outcome that was originally to be implemented. The role
of a phase in the construction is to store in memory which majority is to be punished.
The z-function specifies the majority whose job it is to implement the punishment (by
stopping the program). Transition between phases (4) determines when and how the
majority that is to be punished should be changed. The circularity in punishments
makes the program robust against profitable majority deviations in all phases, i.e., after
all histories.
Of course, the construction of σC is feasible only due to the assumed characteristics
of the consistent choice set C. The existence of such a set is a separate issue, which the
theme of the next section.
We now prove formally that the policy program σC satisfies the one-deviation
property.
Lemma 4. Policy program σC as constructed in (3)–(5) is terminating and satisfies the
one-deviation property.
Proof. To demonstrate that σC is terminating, it suffices to show that, for any x ∈ C,
for any h ∈Hx, and for any y ∈X ,
μ[σ¯C(h y)] =
{
y if y ∈ C \ P(x)
z(x y) if y /∈ C \ P(x). (6)
Consider the two cases separately.
(i) Let y ∈ C \ P(x). By (5), σC(h y)= STOP and, hence, μ[σ¯C(h y)] = y, as desired.
(ii) Let y /∈ C \ P(x). By (5), σC(h y) = z(x y). Since, by (4), (h y) ∈ Hz(xy)
and, by (3), z(x y) ∈ C \ P(z(x y)), it follows by (5) that σC(h yσC(h y)) =
σC(h y z(x y))= STOP. Thus, μ[σ¯C(h y)] = z(x y), as desired.
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It follows from (6) and (3) that either y ∈ C \ P(x) and μ[σ¯C(h y)] = y or y /∈ C \ P(x)
and μ[σ¯C(h y)] = z(x y) ∈ C \ P(x). Therefore,
μ[σ¯C(h y)] ∈ C \ P(x) for all h ∈Hx for all y ∈X and for all x ∈ C (7)
We now show that σC satisfies the one-deviation property. Take any (h y) ∈H such
that h ∈ Hx. It suffices that a one-time deviation from σC(h y) is not profitable. There
are again two cases to consider.
(i) Let y ∈ C \ P(x). By (5), σC(h y) = STOP and, by (6), μ[σ¯C(h y)] = y. A deviation
to w ∈X leads to the history (h yw). Since, by (4), (h y) ∈Hy , applying (7) yields
μ[σ¯C(h yw)] ∈ C \ P(y)
Hence the deviation is not profitable.
(ii) Let y /∈ C \ P(x). By (5), σC(h y)= z(x y) and, by (6), μ[σ¯C(h y)] = z(x y). There
are two kinds of deviations. (a) A deviation to stop implements y. By (3), z(x y) ∈
R(y); thus, the deviation is not profitable. (b) A deviation to w ∈X \ {z(x y)} leads
to the history (h yw). Since, by (4), (h y) ∈Hz(xy), applying (7) yields
μ[σ¯C(h yw)] ∈ C \ P(z(x y))
Hence the deviation is not profitable. 
By Lemma 3, a set Y of alternatives is implementable via a terminating policy pro-
gram that meets the one-deviation property only if Y is a consistent choice set. Con-
versely, by Lemma 4, outcomes of any consistent choice can be implemented via a ter-
minating policy program that meets the one-deviation property. We compound these
observations into the following characterization.
Theorem 5. Set Y of alternatives is implementable via a terminating policy program
that satisfies the one-deviation property if and only if Y is a consistent choice set.
The application of the characterization result is illustrated in the following two ex-
amples. The first concerns the classic Condorcet cycle in which rational decision making
is often deemed pathologically difficult.
Example 6. Let X = {x y z}, and let x P y, y P z, and z P x. Then X itself is a consistent
choice set. Hence there is a terminating policy program that meets the one-deviation
property that can commit to implement any element of X . ♦
It is instructive to construct a concrete policy program that meets the one-deviation
property in the case of a Condorcet cycle. Identify a partitioning {HxHyHz} of the set
of histories H recursively as follows. Initial step: ∅ ∈Hw for some w ∈X . Inductive step:
for any h ∈H, the following statements hold:
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Figure 1. Dominance structure in Example 7.
– If h ∈Hx, then (hx) ∈Hx and (h y) (h z) ∈Hy .
– If h ∈Hy , then (h y) ∈Hy and (h z) (hx) ∈Hz .
– If h ∈Hz , then (h z) ∈Hz and (hx) (h y) ∈Hx.
Choose a policy program that is conditioned on the past history and the current
status quo as follows:
– If h ∈Hx, then σ(hx)= σ(h y)= STOP and σ(hz)= y.
– If h ∈Hy , then σ(h y)= σ(hz)= STOP and σ(hx)= z.
– If h ∈Hz , then σ(hz)= σ(hx)= STOP and σ(h y)= x.
To see that the constructed σ satisfies the one-deviation property, let, say, h ∈ Hx.
Obediently following σ implements x in one step under (hx), y in one step under (h y),
and y in two steps under (h z). Note that x y ∈R−1(x). A one-time deviation to σ(hx)
implements, in two steps, an outcome in R−1(x), a one-time deviation to σ(h y) imple-
ments, in two steps, an outcome in R−1(y), and a one-time deviation to σ(hz) imple-
ments either z immediately or, in two steps, an outcome in R−1(y). Hence no one-time
deviation is profitable.
The next example demonstrates how the one-deviation property restricts outcomes
from being implementable.12
Example 7. Let X = {x y zw}, and let y P x, z P y, w P z, x P w, x P z, and y P w (see
Figure 1, where x→ y means xP y, etc.). Then the unique consistent choice set is {x y z}
and, hence, w cannot be implemented via a terminating policy program that meets the
one-deviation property. ♦
To see why w cannot be implemented in Example 7, suppose that there is a history
after which the status quo w is implemented. Consider a one-time deviation where the
status quo w is replaced with x. Since the deviation is not profitable, the outcome that
becomes implemented cannot be x. Since the only alternative that is (at least weakly)
preferred to the status quo x is y, it follows that y must be implemented. But since y is
also preferred to w, the original deviation from implementing w is profitable. Hence, w
cannot be implemented by a policy program that meets the one-deviation property.
12See Vartiainen (2011, Figure 1) and Konishi and Ray (2003, Example 10) for other treatments of this
case.
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History dependence is crucial for Theorem 5. To see this, consider a simple (or mem-
oryless or Markovian) policy program, where the policy action depends only on the sta-
tus quo alternative, not on the history. A simple policy program can be described by a
function σ :X →X ∪ {STOP}, where σ(x) is the action when x is the status quo.
Simplicity is a harsh restriction on a policy program. To understand the nature of the
constraint, let us define a version of another well known solution. A set V ⊆X is a (von
Neumann–Morgenstern) weakly stable set if (i) x ∈ V implies that there is no y ∈ V such
that y P x and (ii) x /∈ V implies that there is y ∈ V such that y R x.13
A weakly stable set is a consistent choice set, but a consistent choice set need not be
a weakly stable set. The proof of the following proposition appears in Section A.1.
Proposition 8. The set V of alternatives is implementable by a simple policy program
that meets the one-deviation property if and only if V is a weakly stable set.
It is well known that a weakly stable set—and, hence, a simple policy program that
satisfies the one-deviation property—often does not exist. In fact, if R is a tournament
relation (i.e., x R y and y R x imply x = y), then V is a weakly stable set if and only if
V = {x}, where x is the strong Condorcet winner.14 In the absence of such an element,
any terminating policy program that satisfies the one-deviation property must be his-
tory dependent. Our next task is to show that such a policy program always exists.
4. Existence
In this section, we prove the main result of the paper: a consistent choice set and, hence,
a terminating policy program, that satisfies the one-deviation property exists. We de-
velop an iterative procedure that identifies the maximal consistent choice set. Our con-
struction is related to the notion of deep covering and its iterations (see Duggan 2013).
Given a subset B of X , we say that x quasi-covers y under B if
R(x)∩B ⊆ P(y)∩B and x y ∈X (8)
The prefix “quasi” refers to the property of (8) that covering between two elements in X
is restricted to B. When B =X , quasi-covering coincides with deep covering, but when
B =X , the two notions differ. A more detailed comparison between quasi-covering and
deep covering appears at the end of this section.
Denote the maximal elements of the quasi-covering relation under B by QU(B), the
quasi-uncovered set under B:
QU(B) := {x ∈X :x is not quasi-covered by y ∈X under B}
13The qualifier “weak” refers to the fact that external stability is defined with respect to R rather than P
(see, e.g., Anesi and Seidmann forthcoming). When R is a tournament relation, this difference becomes
vacuous.
14Existence conditions can be relaxed when the social preference relation is inherited from a richer vot-
ing structure than majority voting or when the underlying choice domain is restricted (see Penn 2008, Anesi
2010, 2012, Anesi and Seidmann forthcoming).
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That is, QU(B) comprises all alternatives in X that are not quasi-covered under B by
any element in X . Note that QU(B) need not be a subset of B or even have common
elements with B. Even though the quasi-covering relation is transitive, the existence of a
maximal element could be an issue. The next result verifies that these concerns are not
warranted for any B.15
Lemma 9. The set QU(B) is nonempty for any B ⊆X .
Proof. By the Hausdorff maximal principle, there is a maximal subset {xα}α∈A of X
that is totally ordered by the quasi-covering relation under B such that xβ quasi-covers
xα under B if β> α. Since P(xβ)⊆R(xβ),
P(xβ)∩B ⊆ P(xα)∩B if β> α (9)
Since P(x) is an open set for all x, P(·) ∩ B is lower hemicontinuous as a correspon-
dence. Let x¯ ∈X be an accumulation point of {xα}. Such a point exists since X is a com-
pact space. By (9), and since P(·) ∩ B lower hemicontinuous, P(x¯) ∩ B ⊆⋂α P(xα) ∩ B.
We claim that x¯ is not quasi-covered under B. If it were, then there is y ∈ X such that
R(y) ∩ B ⊆ P(x¯) ∩ B. But then also R(y) ∩ B ⊆ P(xα) ∩ B for all α ∈ A, which contra-
dicts the assumption that {xα} is a maximal subset of X that is totally ordered by the
quasi-covering relation. 
Duggan (2013) shows that the deep uncovered set of a closed subset B of X is closed.
We complement this result by showing that the quasi-uncovered set under a closed set
B is also closed.
Lemma 10. Let B be a closed subset ofX . Then QU(B) is closed.
Proof. Suppose that QU(B) is not a closed subset of a compact space, i.e., compact.
Then there is a net {xα} ⊆ QU(B) with a limit point x ∈ X such that x /∈ QU(B). Since x
is quasi-covered under B, there is y ∈ B such that R(y)∩B ⊆ P(x)∩B. Since xα ∈QU(B)
for all α, also R(y) ∩ B  P(xα) ∩ B for all α. That is, there is zα such that zα ∈ R(y) ∩
R−1(xα) ∩ B for all α. Since B is a closed subset of a compact space, {zα} has a subnet
{zβ} with a limit z ∈ B. Then {xβ} also has the limit x. Since R(y) is a closed set and
R−1(·) is upper hemicontinuous, z ∈R(y)∩R−1(x)∩B. But then y does not quasi-cover
x under B, a contradiction. 
While QU(B) may, in general, contain elements outside B, we now show that this
is not the case when B is obtained by iterating the quasi-uncovered set from the grand
set X . The iterations are defined by transfinite recursion as by transfinite recursion as
follows:16
• QU 0 =X
• QUα =QU(⋂β<αQUβ) for any ordinal α> 0.
15Duggan (2013) shows the nonemptiness of the deep uncovered set under compact B.
16Finitely many inductive steps suffice when X is a finite set.
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Lemma 11. For any ordinal α> 0, QUα ⊆⋂β<αQUβ.
Proof. The claim holds for α= 1. Assume that the claim holds for all ordinals β< α for
a given ordinal α > 1. By transfinite induction, it suffices to show that the claim holds
also for α. Let x /∈⋂β<αQUβ. Then there is β∗ <α such that x /∈QUβ∗ . By construction,
QUβ
∗ =QU(⋂γ<β∗ QUγ). Thus there is y ∈X such that
R(y)∩
( ⋂
γ<β∗
QUγ
)
⊆ P(x)∩
( ⋂
γ<β∗
QUγ
)
 (10)
Now
⋂
β<αQU
β ⊆ QUβ∗ ⊆ ⋂γ<β∗ QUγ , where the first inclusion follows from β∗ < α
and the second follows from the supposition. Thus, by (10),
R(y)∩
(⋂
β<α
QUβ
)
⊆ P(x)∩
(⋂
β<α
QUβ
)

which implies x /∈QU(⋂β<αQUβ)=QUα. Hence QUα ⊆⋂β<αQUβ. 
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 11.
Corollary 12. For any two ordinals β< α, QUα ⊆QUβ.
This corollary implies that QU(QUα−1)=QUα for any ordinal α that has a predeces-
sor. When X is a finite set, this holds for every ordinal. Thus, in this case, the iterative
procedure has a simple form: QU 0 =X and QUk+1 =QU(QUk) for all k= 01    . The
procedure also ends in finite time, i.e., there is a K such that QUK = QU(QUK). How-
ever, in a general case, such final stage K may not exist. Instead, to reach a fixed point of
the QU(·) correspondence, a more elaborate argument is needed.
Lemma 13. The set QUα is closed and nonempty for any ordinal α.
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction. Since X is compact and nonempty, QU 0 is
closed and nonempty. Suppose that QUβ is closed and nonempty for all ordinals β< α.
We show that it holds also for the ordinal α. Since, by Corollary 12 and the assump-
tion,
⋂
β<αQU
β is an intersection of nested closed and nonempty sets, it is closed and
nonempty. By Lemmata 9 and 10, QUα is closed and nonempty. 
Our aim is to show that the ultimate quasi-uncovered set UQU , defined construc-
tively by
UQU :=
⋂
α
QUα
constitutes a consistent choice set. Note that the existence of UQU is not an issue: it is a
complement of a union of a collection of well defined sets.
We first argue that UQU is a fixed point of the QU(·) correspondence.
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Lemma 14. We have UQU =QU(UQU).
Proof. ⊇: Suppose that x ∈ QU(⋂αQUα) \ ⋂αQUα. Then there is α such that
x /∈ QUα = QU(⋂β<αQUβ). Hence, there is y ∈ X such that y quasi-covers x under⋂
β<αQU
β. But
⋂
αQU
α ⊆⋂β<αQUβ implies that y quasi-covers x also under⋂αQUα,
contradicting x ∈QU(⋂αQUα).
⊆: Suppose that x ∈⋂αQUα \QU(⋂αQUα). Then there is y ∈X such that y quasi-
covers x under
⋂
αQU
α. Since QUα = QU(⋂β<αQUβ), y does not quasi-cover x under⋂
β<αQU
β for any α. Thus, for any α, there is a zα such that
zα ∈R(y)∩R−1(x)∩
(⋂
β<α
QUβ
)

Since X is compact, we can assume that {zα} is a convergent net with a limit z.
By Lemma 11, the sequence of sets {⋂β<γQUβ}γ≥α is nested and, hence, {zγ}γ≥α ⊆⋂
β<αQU
β for all α. Since, by Lemma 13,
⋂
β<αQU
β is a closed set, z ∈ ⋂β<αQUβ.
Since this holds for any α, z ∈⋂α⋂β<αQUβ =⋂αQUα. Since R(·) and R−1(·) are upper
hemicontinuous correspondences, also z ∈R(y)∩R−1(x). Thus
z ∈R(y)∩R−1(x)∩
(⋂
α
QUα
)

But this contradicts the assumption that y quasi-covers x under
⋂
αQU
α. 
By Lemma 14, no element in UQU is quasi-covered in UQU by any element in X .
The next theorem, which is the main result of this paper, uses this property to establish
that UQU is a consistent choice set. It is also argued that UQU is the maximal consistent
choice set (in the sense of set inclusion).
Theorem 15. The set UQU is a consistent choice set. Moreover, UQUcontains as a subset
any consistent choice set.
Proof. We first argue that UQU is a consistent choice set. By Lemma 13 and Corol-
lary 12, {QUα} is a collection of nested, closed, and nonempty sets in a compact space.
Thus, their intersection, UQU , is closed and nonempty. Take any x ∈ UQU and any
y ∈ X \ {x}. Since, by Lemma 14, x is not quasi-covered by y ∈ X under UQU , there is z
such that z ∈R(y)∩UQU \ P(x), as required.
We now demonstrate that UQU contains as a subset any consistent choice set. Let
C be a consistent choice set. We show that C ⊆ UQU . By the definition of a consistent
choice set, C ∩ R(y) \ P(x) is nonempty for all x ∈ C and for all y ∈ X . Thus, for any
B ⊆X such that C ⊆ B,
R(y)∩B P(x)∩B for all x ∈ C for all y ∈X (11)
Choosing B = X = QU 0 in (11), by the definition of quasi-covering, C ⊆ QU(QU 0) =
QU 1. Let C ⊆⋂β<αQUβ for given α. Choosing B =⋂β<αQUβ in (11), by the definition
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of quasi-covering, C ⊆QU(⋂β<αQUβ)=QUα. By transfinite induction, C ⊆⋂αQUα =
UQU . 
As UQU is a well defined set of the topological space X , Theorem 15 automatically
implies that a consistent choice set exists.
Finally, we tie the existence results concerning consistent choice sets to the existence
issue of policy programs that satisfy the one-deviation property. By Theorem 5, we have
shown that a terminating policy program with the one-deviation property does exist and
that the set of outcomes that are implementable via any such program is contained in
the ultimate uncovered set.
Corollary 16. There is a terminating policy program that meets the one-deviation
property that implements outcomes in UQU. Moreover, UQU contains all outcomes that
can be implemented via any terminating policy program that meets the one-deviation
property.
Thus, it is without loss of generality to focus on the ultimate quasi-uncovered set
UQU if one is interested in the welfare consequences of dynamic political decision
making.
External stability, deep covering, and covering sets
We now connect the quasi-uncovered set and its iterations to the deep uncovered set
(Duggan 2013) and to the covering set (Dutta 1988).17 Given a subset B of X , we say that
x deep covers y in B if
R(x)∩B ⊆ P(y)∩B and x y ∈ B
The set of deep uncovered outcomes in B is
DU(B) := {x ∈X :x is not deep covered by y ∈ B in B}
The difference between quasi-covering under B and deep covering in B is that the latter
concerns only outcomes in B, but the former accounts for covering relations over out-
comes in X . This has profound consequences on the associated uncovered sets. While
quasi-covering under B leaves more room for an outcome in B to be covered (i.e., by
an outcome not in B), it may also allow an outcome not in B to be uncovered under B.
Hence, in general, a clear relationship does not exist between the quasi-uncovered set
DU(B) and the deep uncovered set DU(B).
However, we next observe that iteration of the quasi-uncovered set leads to more se-
lective sets of outcomes than does iteration of the deep uncovered set. Define the itera-
tions of the deep uncovered set as follows. Set DU 0 =X and let DUα =DU(⋂β<αDUβ)
for all ordinals α. By construction, DU(DUα)=DUα+1 for all ordinals α.
17For different notions of covering, see Duggan (2013) and Penn (2006).
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Duggan (2013) shows that the deep uncovered set of a compact set is closed and
nonempty. Hence, by transfinite induction, DUα is closed and nonempty, and the ulti-
mate deep uncovered set UDU =⋂αDUα is nonempty.18 The proof of the next proposi-
tion is relegated to Section A.1.
Proposition 17. We have QUα ⊆DUα for any ordinal α.
By Proposition 17, since UQU =⋂αQUα and UDU =⋂αDUα, it immediately fol-
lows that also UQU ⊆ UDU . Thus, by Theorem 15, we conclude that the ultimate deep
uncovered set UDU contains as a subset all consistent choice sets and, hence, all out-
comes that can be implemented via a terminating policy program that meets the one-
deviation property. However, when the inclusion UQU ⊆ UDU is strict, Theorem 15
also implies that UDU is not a consistent choice set. In such a case, UDU contains el-
ements that cannot be implemented via a terminating policy program that meets the
one-deviation property, by Theorem 5.
When X is a finite set, the ultimate uncovered set is externally stable in the sense
that for any outcome x not in UQU , there is another outcome y in UQU that covers x in
UQU ∪ {x}. This is deemed as a desirable property of the set since it guarantees that the
play always converges back to the set.
A problematic feature of general infinite domains is that external stability of the ul-
timate uncovered set does no carry over to there, as discussed by Duggan (2013). It is,
therefore, noteworthy that our existence result concerning policy processes that meet
the one-deviation property (Theorem 15) does not have to rely on the external stabil-
ity of UQU . What suffices for the one-deviation property is that any x in UQU is not
quasi-covered in UQU by any element in X . This questions the importance of external
stability as a necessary reflection of strategically sophisticated voting behavior.
However, external stability does have an interpretation in terms of the one-deviation
principle. We now argue that if a set happens to be externally and internally stable in
the sense of the covering set of Dutta (1988), then it is a consistent choice set.
A covering set D is defined by the property that x ∈X is not deep covered in D∪ {x}
if and only if x ∈ D. We now argue that any covering set is a consistent choice set (see
Section A.1 for a proof).
Proposition 18. LetD⊆X be a covering set. ThenD is a consistent choice set.
By construction, the characterizing feature of a covering set is that it is stable, both
externally and internally: no element x in D is deep covered in D∪{x} and every element
x not in D is deep covered in D∪{x}. Proposition 18 points out that these properties can
be used to construct a policy process that meets the one-deviation property. However,
the converse is not true even when X is a finite set. There are consistent choice sets that
are not covering sets. That is, a policy process that meets the one-deviation property
need not reflect external stability even in the finite case (see the working paper version
of this paper).
18The ultimate uncovered set is analyzed in the finite case, e.g., by Miller (1980) and Dutta (1988). In that
case, all the notions of covering coincide.
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5. Noncooperative interpretation
We now argue that the one-deviation property of a policy program (2) characterizes sub-
game perfect equilibria of many natural legislative bargaining procedures. We construct
a game form in which all the strong subgame perfect equilibria, i.e., those that are robust
against coalitional deviations, are described by (2).
Consider the situation where there is an odd number n of voters choosing a policy
in X . Denote the (complete, transitive) preferences of voter i with asymmetric prefer-
ences Pi. The associated majority relation M is defined by
xM y if |{i :x Pi y}|> n2 
Denote by M¯ the completion of M , i.e. x M¯ y if not y M x for all x y ∈X .
Consider the following dynamic plurality voting procedure P . Voting takes place in
discrete periods t = 01    . At period t = 0, there is an initial status quo policy x0. At
period t, the voters cast their votes simultaneously from {STOP} ∪ X . If stop receives a
larger number of votes than any y ∈ X , then the status quo xt is implemented. If the
outcome y ∈ X receives a larger number of votes than z ∈ X \ {y} or stop, then y be-
comes the new status quo xt+1 at stage t + 1. In the case of a tie, a winner is chosen
by some deterministic rule. The game continues until a policy is implemented. Never
implementing a policy is strictly worse for all the agents than implementing any of the
policies in X in finite time. There is no discounting.
Denote by H the set of possible histories of status quos. For simplicity, let us assume
that the dynamic voting strategy φ is conditioned on H. Summarize the voting act of the
agents after history h when x is the status quo by φ(hx) ∈ {STOP} ∪X such that
φ(hx)=
{
STOP if stop is the winner of the plurality voting at (hx)
y if y ∈X is the winner of the plurality voting at (hx).
Denote by φτ(h) the τth iteration of φ starting from h. Let φ¯(h) = (φ0(h)φ1(h)   ).
Then, as in Section 2, μ[φ¯(h)] is the outcome that is implemented when the agents ad-
here to strategy φ after history h, i.e., for all (hx) ∈H,
μ[φ¯(hx)] =
{
x if stop is the winner of the plurality voting at (hx)
μ[φ¯(hx y)] if y ∈X is the winner of the plurality voting at (hx).
In particular, μ[φ¯(hφ(h))] = μ[φ¯(h)] for all h.
As before, our focus is on terminating equilibria that implement an outcome in finite
time after any history. Our solution concept is the strong subgame perfect equilibria
(SSPE), requiring that a strategy profile be immune to profitable coalitional deviations,
where each member of the coalition strictly benefits from the deviation. No restrictions
are set on the form of the coalition. In the case of a terminating strategy profile and since
any infinite terminal history is worse for all players than any finite terminal history, it is
sufficient to check that there is no profitable one-time deviation for any coalition (at
a single instant of time). Thus, after any history, there should be no coalition whose
members would strictly benefit from a deviation, given the continuation play.
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It is now easy to see that any SSPE is characterized by (1). In an SSPE, the strategy
must be such that a majority coalition cannot profitably make a one-time deviation to
the play path. Hence
not μ[φ¯(hxa)]M μ[φ¯(hx)] for all a ∈ {STOP} ∪X (12)
Equivalently,
μ[φ¯(hx)] M¯ μ[φ¯(hxa)] for all a ∈ {STOP} ∪X (13)
For sufficiency, suppose that φ satisfies (13) and that φ arises from a voting strategy
in which any voter chooses φ(h) at history h. Then a deviation from the equilibrium
path requires a deviation by a majority coalition. But since φ satisfies (12), there is no
majority coalition whose members strictly prefer a one-time deviation. Thus φ is a SSPE.
The proof of the following proposition is relegated to Section A.1.
Proposition 19. Strategy φ arises from a terminating SSPE voting strategy of the dy-
namic plurality procedure P if and only if there is a terminating policy program σ that
satisfies the one-deviation property with respect to the binary relation M¯ such thatφ= σ .
The “if” part of the proof suggests the following hypothesis. Any sequential moves
legislative bargaining game that has the property that, after any nonterminal history,
any majority coalition can force, by mutually coordinated action, the implementation
of any given outcome, has a subgame perfect equilibrium that corroborates a terminat-
ing policy program that meets the one-deviation restriction. An example of such a game
is the nondiscounted version of the classic Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model (either ver-
sion). In related work, Anesi and Seidmann (forthcoming) and Anesi (2006, 2010, 2012)
demonstrate how Markov perfect equilibria (that are dependent only on the current sta-
tus quo) are characterized by vNM stable sets in various amendment games.
However, as our one-deviation restriction is conditioned only on the histories of sta-
tus quos, noncooperative agenda amendment games may also entertain equilibria that
it does not characterize. These equilibria are sensitive to the recognition protocol that
specifies how the amendment proposal is made in each stage.
6. Relation to some other models
In this section, we connect our results to the solution concepts of Bernheim and Slavov
(2009), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Vartiainen (2011). The solution of Bernheim and
Slavov (2009) can only be applied to a “real time” blocking model, where infinitely lived
agents gain per period utility from a state that may be affected by the society. However,
the solutions of Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011) also fit well to the cur-
rent scenario, where a single social decision is made once and for all after a coalitional
contemplation.
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6.1 Bernheim and Slavov (2009)
Bernheim and Slavov (2009) expand the idea of Condorcet dominance to a setting where
political decisions are made repeatedly. The set X of outcomes is now interpreted as the
set of social states that may change in dates t = 01    . Policy making is now an ongoing
process where the individuals gain benefits from the policy choices in each period t.
There is a set {1     n} of agents. Each agent i = 1     n is endowed with a per period
utility function ui :X →R.
Letting H denote the set of all possible finite paths of social alternatives—the set of
histories—a dynamic policy program is now a function σ :H →X , capturing the transi-
tions from one history to another. Let H be the set of all histories of states (x0     xt),
where x0 is exogenously given. The transition from history h to the next history (hσ(h))
is induced by a winning majority coalition whose members stand to benefit from it. As
before, σt(h) denotes the tth iteration of σ , starting from the history h.
We now focus on policy programs that are absorbing in the sense that after all his-
tories, the policy path converges in finite time to an absorbing state in which it stays
permanently. That is, for any history h, there is an integer Th such that σt(h)= x for all
t > Th. The absorbing state of the policy program σ that starts from history h is then well
defined for all h and is denoted by α[σ(h)].
We assume that there is no discounting: the intertemporal payoffs are evaluated by
the limit-of-the-means criterion. For an absorbing policy program, it holds then that the
intertemporal payoff of agent i from policy σ at history h ∈H is given by ui(α[σ¯(h)]).
The majority relation M ⊂X ×X is defined by
xM y if
∣∣{i :ui(x)≥ ui(y)}∣∣> n2  (14)
An absorbing policy program σ is a dynamic Condorcet winner (DCW) if
α[σ¯(hx)]M α[σ¯(hx y)] for all (hx) ∈H for all y ∈X (15)
The key difference between DCW and our one-time deviation criterion is that there the
relationship is never-ending, whereas in our model, the game ends when the one-shot
decision is made. In other words, in our context, the majority can permanently commit
to the current state, but in Bernheim and Slavov (2009) it cannot. Nothing prevents the
program from moving from the current state to a “path of states” state that is worse for
a majority coalition than the status quo outcome. As a consequence, for a DCW, it does
not need to hold that
α[σ¯(hx)]M x (16)
which makes our necessary condition (2) vacuous. The existence result of Bernheim
and Slavov (2009) hinges on this additional leeway. Moreover, because their solution
does not demand (16), it cannot be applied to the one-time decision making situation,
which is the theme of this paper.
We now argue that the one-deviation restriction is a strictly stronger condition than
DCW. To this end, replace a policy program σC as constructed in (3)–(5) with an ever-
continuing program that is otherwise equivalent but has the property that σC(qx y) =
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STOP is replaced by an infinite repetition of y (for a precise construction, see Section A.2).
Then σC has C as the set of absorbing states.
By Lemma 4, σC meets (15) and, hence, is a DCW. By Theorem 5, we can state the
following proposition.
Proposition 20. For any consistent choice set C, defined with respect to the majority
relationM , there is a DCWwith C as the set of absorbing states.
However, the converse is not true. To see this, recall the sufficient condition (ad-
justed to our finite, no-discounting case) of Bernheim and Slavov (2009, Theorem 3(ii)):
If there is a Condorcet cycle w1w2    wK such that wk M wk+1 for all k= 1    K − 1
and wK P w1, then each state wk can be supported as an absorbing state of an absorbing
DCW.19
The following example demonstrates that some absorbing states of a DCW cannot be
implemented via a terminating policy program that meets the one-deviation restriction.
Denote uS(x)= (ui(x))i∈S for any S ⊆ {1     n}.
Example 21. There are three agents {123} and four states X = {x y zw}. The payoffs
are
u{123}(x) = (134)
u{123}(y) = (341)
u{123}(z) = (412)
u{123}(w) = (223)
These payoffs induce a majority relation over states such that y M x, zM y, wM z, xM w,
xM z, and y M w, the case depicted in Example 7. Thus the unique consistent choice set
is {x y z}. However, since any state in X is a member of a Condorcet cycle, any of them
can be supported as an absorbing state of an absorbing DCW. ♦
6.2 Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011)
We now relate the one-deviation property (1) to the equilibrium condition of Konishi
and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011). The key finding is that the one-deviation property
is stronger, as it is not conditioned on the identities of the active coalitions and requires
robustness against all feasible coalitional deviations. Consequently, the one-deviation
property is not only independent of the details of the coalition formation technology—
a desirable property from the viewpoint of institution-free predictions—but it also has
more cutting power than the equilibrium condition of Vartiainen (2011), when applied
to the majority choice context (we prove this by an example). Moreover, the current
setup proves the existence of the solution far beyond the finite case studied in Vartiainen
(2011).
19Bernheim and Slavov (2009) actually say something stronger: that such wk can be supported as an
absorbing state of a DCW that always converges to an absorbing state in at most two periods.
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There is a set {1     n} of agents, making a one-shot decision from the set X of so-
cial alternatives. Agent i has a utility function ui :X → R. Each coalition S ⊆ {1     n}
has an opportunity to move the play from the status quo outcome x to any outcome
in the set FS(x) ⊆ X ∪ {STOP} such that STOP ∈ FS(x) for all S. Coalitional actions may
be contingent on past coalitional actions and, hence, a history consists of a sequence
such as x0 S1x1     Skxk, where the status quo xj ∈ X is induced by the coalition
Sj ⊆ {1     n} for all j = 1    k. If, under status quo x, all coalitions agree on stop,
then x is implemented.
In the current context, the process of coalition formation specifies the next status
quo and the coalition that induces it. The process of coalition formation is then charac-
terized by a pair of functions (σ I), defined for all past histories hˆ = (x0 S0x1 S2    
xk−1 Sk) and current status quos x such that I(hˆx)⊆ {1     n} and σ(hˆx) ∈ FI(hˆx)(x).
Letting (Itσt)(hˆx) = (Iσ)(hˆx (I0σ0)(hˆx)     (It−1σt−1)(hˆx)) for all t = 1    ,
we can now describe agent i’s payoff from a terminating process of coalition formation
simply as ui(μ[σ¯(hˆ x)]), where σ¯(hˆ x)= (σ0(hˆx)σ1(hˆx)   ) is a sequence of status
quos that originates from the history (hˆx) and where μ[σ¯(hˆ x)] is the final element of
that sequence.
If coalition S chooses a coalitional action a ∈ FS(x) after history (hˆx), then
μ[σ¯(hˆ xSa)] =
{
μ[σ¯(hˆ xS y)] if a= y ∈X
x if a= STOP.
For any coalition S, use the notation uS(x) > uS(y) if ui(x) > ui(y) for all i ∈ S and use
uS(x) ≥ uS(y) if ui(x) ≥ ui(y) for all i ∈ S. Given a terminating process of coalition for-
mation (σ I) and a history (hˆx), we say that a coalition S has a weakly preferred move
a ∈ FS(x) from x if uS(μ[σ¯(hˆ xSa)])≥ uS(x). Furthermore, a move a is efficient for the
coalition S if there is no b ∈ FS(x) such that uS(μ[σ¯(hˆ xSb)]) > uS(μ[σ¯(hˆ xSa)]).
Given these notions, we may now specify the solution concept of Konishi and Ray
(2003), as defined by Vartiainen (2011).20 A terminating process of coalition formation
(σ I) is a dynamic equilibrium process of coalition formation (DEPCF) if it satisfies, for
all histories of coalitionalmoves, i.e., (hˆx) ∈⋃∞k=0(X×{all coalitions})k×X , the follow-
ing conditions:
(i) If σ(hˆx) ∈ X , then σ(hˆx) is an efficient and weakly preferred move from x for
the coalition I(hˆx).
(ii) If σ(hˆx)= STOP, then stop is an efficient move from x for all coalitions S.
Vartiainen (2011) characterizes DEPCF and proves its existence when X is a finite
set.21
20To interpret the results of this subsection in the infinitely repeated blocking model of Konishi and Ray
(2003), exchange the notion of absorbing state with the act of stopping, as in Section 6.1.
21In the formulation of Vartiainen (2011), the notation is simplified by encoding the identity of the active
coalition directly into the definition of an outcome. A history dependent process of coalition formation can
then be described by the function σ alone. Despite this superficial simplification, histories of the active
coalitions are used by the solution at each step and they are crucial for the existence result.
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From the viewpoint of institution-free predictions, DEPCF is not an unproblematic
concept, however. First, as also discussed by Konishi and Ray (2003, Appendix A), part (i)
of the definition relies on an implicit commitment assumption. Once a majority coali-
tion I(hx) activates, no other coalition can do anything to affect the next status quo.
What if there is another majority coalition that prefers another outcome, given the con-
tinuation play paths from the possible histories after the next step?22 The ideal way to
circumvent this problem would be to require efficiency for all the relevant coalitions.
The second problem, which is related to the first, concerns the level of information
embedded into the notion of history. That the identities of the active coalitions may af-
fect the process is a strong assumption and requires extensive knowledge on individual
voters’ preferences. It also rules out some commonly used voting technologies, e.g., se-
cret ballots. A more satisfactory concept would be insensitive to unreasonable details
by being dependent only on the history of commonly observed variables, such as the
sequence of status quos. Under such circumstances, it would not matter which one of
the coalitions induces the next status quo.
Both of the above concerns are avoided if the solution concept is required to be inde-
pendent of the identity of the blocking coalition. We now argue that the one-deviation
property (1) can be interpreted as such a solution. Formally, define a strengthened ver-
sion of DEPCF for all histories of status quos, i.e., (hx) ∈⋃∞k=0Xk:
(i*) If σ(hx) ∈X , then σ(hx) is an efficient move for all coalitions S and is a weakly
preferred move from x for some coalition S.
(ii*) If σ(hx)= STOP, then stop is an efficient move from x for all coalitions S.
Note that this version of DEPCF uses no information on the identities of the ac-
tive coalitions anywhere. Hence, the function σ alone specifies the coalition formation
process.
Let us call a terminating coalition formation process σ that meets (i*) and (ii*) as a
DEPCF*. Since DEPCF* relies on weaker informational conditions and requires stronger
efficiency properties, any DEPCF* is a DEPCF. We now argue that DEPCF* is equivalent
to the one-deviation property in the current context.
Let us define a majority relation M as in (14). The next proposition, whose proof
is found in Section A.1, states the equivalence between the one-deviation restriction
and DEPCF* when applied to endogenous majority choice. The key observation is that
the second part of (i*), that σ(hx) should be a weakly preferred move from x for some
S whenever σ(hx) ∈ X , becomes redundant when DEPCF* is applied to the majority
choice context.
Proposition 22. Let FS(x) = X for all majority coalitions S and let FS(x) = {STOP} for
all other coalitions. Then σ is a DEPCF* if and only if it satisfies the one-deviation prop-
erty with respect to the majority relationM .
By Theorem 15, a DEPCF* exists. The proof of Vartiainen (2011) concerning the exis-
tence of a DEPCF in a finite setup critically hinges on the assumption that the histories
22For a criticism of the assumption and an alternative approach, see Xue (1998).
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can also be conditioned on the identities of the active coalitions. Hence, the existence of
a DEPCF* is a novel result, even when restricted to a finite set X .23
We now demonstrate that DEPCF* has strictly more cutting power than DEPCF. Since
any DEPCF* is a DEPCF, it suffices, by Theorem 5 and Proposition 22, to find a situation
where the implemented outcomes of a DEPCF do not form a consistent choice set. A de-
tailed description of the DEPCF used in the next example can be found in Section A.3.
Example 23. Reconsider the situation depicted in Example 21 and interpret the states
as feasible social alternatives. There is a DEPCF that implements any of the alternatives
{x y zw}. ♦
Recall from Example 7 that the unique consistent choice set in this case is {x y z}.
Since, by Proposition 22, a DEPCF* permits only implementation of this set of outcomes,
w is ruled out as a robust prediction when moving from DEPCF to DEPCF*.
The observation that any of the alternatives {x y zw} can be implemented in a
DEPCF relies on knowledge of the identities of active coalitions.24 The DEPCF that is
used punishes any coalition that deviates from implementing an element in {x y zw}
and it punishes any coalition that fails to obey the punishment scheme.
In particular, in the constructed DEPCF, it is reliable for the coalitions to implement
w, since a deviation to x by the coalition {23} can be punished by allowing the coali-
tion {12} to move the game further to y, which is then implemented. This construction,
which renders the original deviation unprofitable for the deviating coalition, crucially
depends on the assumption that the punishment can be made contingent on the iden-
tity of the coalition: if it cannot, then {12} will make the original deviation from w to
x, so as to induce y. To prevent such a deviation, coalition {12} must be punished in
a different way, by implementing x. Thus, without knowing in detail which coalition
made the deviation and what the preferences are of the members of the active coalition,
one cannot tailor the punishment correctly and one cannot keep it optimal for all the
coalitions not to deviate. In the absence of detailed knowledge of the coalition forma-
tion technology or of the preferences of the agents, one should, therefore, be cautious in
assuming that w can be implemented.
Comparing Proposition 22 to (15) and (16), it then follows that DEPCF* also refines
DCW in the model of Bernheim and Slavov (2009). That DEPCF* has strictly more cutting
power follows from Examples 21 and 23.
7. Concluding remarks
We study farsighted political decision making when the voting acts may be conditioned
on the history. We abstract from the details of the voting procedure and assume that
individual preferences are aggregated by a social preference (e.g., majority) ordering.
23The result relies on the assumed properties of the coalitional choice sets (FS)S . With general choice
sets, the existence of a DEPCF* cannot be guaranteed.
24Or that any element of {x y zw} can be supported as an absorbing state of the real-time blocking
model of Konishi and Ray (2003).
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Choices are made on the basis of binary comparisons: the current status quo may be
challenged with another outcome and the status quo is implemented if it is not defeated
by any challenger. The key aspect of the model is farsightedness and that blocking be-
havior may be conditioned on the past blockings. The solution we apply is the standard
one-deviation principle.
We establish a reduced form characterization of policy programs that meet the one-
deviation property. Our main result is the general existence of the solution. The condi-
tions under which the existence is shown encompass virtually all scenarios of interest,
including the case of Euclidean preferences. Also, as the characterization is directly in
terms of the underlying majority relation, the solution is readily comparable to other
concepts in the social choice literature.
Our results contribute to the voting literature in three dimensions. First, we show
that the one-deviation property, which is almost a synonym for sequential rationality in
noncooperative models, is also a natural way to model collective decision making in the
canonical social choice scenario.
Second, we show that the prediction problem—the key challenge of coalitional
analysis—can be solved in a reliable way in the political choice scenario. Indeed, our
solution is optimal for all majority coalitions at all times, even under transitory moves,
and, hence, it is independent of many of the details of the institutional structure that
constrain coalitional behavior. Compared to Bernheim and Slavov (2009), Konishi and
Ray (2003), and Vartiainen (2011), the current solution is more robust, has more cut-
ting power, and requires less information on the part of the modeler. We also prove the
existence of the solution in a more general domain.25
Third, we develop a new covering method that has good existence and stability prop-
erties. The iterated version of our uncovered set is used to prove the existence of our
solution.
Appendix
A.1 Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 8. If: Let the set V ⊆ X satisfy internal and external stabil-
ity. By external stability, there is a simple policy program σ :X → X ∪ {STOP} such
that σ(x) = STOP for all x ∈ V and such that σ(x) ∈ R(x) ∩ V for all x /∈ V . Then
V = {x ∈ X :σ(x) = STOP}. We show that σ satisfies the one-deviation property. Let x
be the status quo. If x /∈ V , then obediently following σ implements σ(x). Stopping at
x implements x, which, since σ(x) ∈ R(x), is not a profitable deviation. Any other one-
time deviation implements some y ∈ V . By internal stability, y /∈ P(σ(x)), which implies
that the deviation is not profitable. If x ∈ V , then obediently following σ implements x.
A one-time deviation implements some y ∈ V . By internal stability, y /∈ P(x) and, hence,
the deviation is not profitable.
Only if: Let the function σ :X → X ∪ {STOP} characterize a simple policy program
that meets the one-deviation property. We show that the set V = {x ∈ X :σ(x) = STOP}
25However, the focus of Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011) is in the general coalitional model
à la Chwe (1994).
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satisfies internal and external stability. Let x ∈ V . Suppose that y ∈ P(x) for some y ∈ V .
But then, since σ(y)= STOP, a one-time deviation to y would be profitable when x is the
status quo. Let x /∈ V , i.e., σ(x) = STOP. Identify the outcome y ∈ V that is implemented.
Since stopping the game when x is the status quo is not profitable, y ∈R(x), as desired.

Proof of Proposition 17. The claim holds for α = 0. By transfinite induction, it suf-
fices to show that if the claim holds for the ordinals β< α, then it holds also for the ordi-
nal α. Assume that QUβ ⊆ DUβ for all β< α. Let x /∈ DUα. Then there is y ∈⋂β<αDUβ
such that y deep covers x in
⋂
β<αDU
β and, hence, y quasi-covers x under
⋂
β<αDU
β.
By assumption,
⋂
β<αQU
β ⊆⋂β<αDUβ. But then y quasi-covers x under ⋂β<αQUβ
and, hence, x /∈QU(⋂β<αQUβ)=QUα. 
Proof of Proposition 18. Take x ∈ D and let y ∈ X . We find an element z in D such
that z ∈ R(y) \ P(x). If y /∈ P(x), then x = z qualifies as such an element. Thus let y ∈
P(x). If y ∈ D, then since D is a covering set, it follows that R(y) ∩D P(x) ∩D. Thus,
there is z ∈D such that z ∈R(y) \ P(x).
Thus let y ∈ P(x) \ D. Since D is a covering set, there is z ∈ D such that R(z) ∩ D ⊆
P(y) ∩D. Since z ∈ P(y), we are done if z /∈ P(x). Suppose that z ∈ P(x). Since xz ∈ D
and D is a covering set, necessarily R(z) ∩D P(x) ∩D. Thus there is w ∈ D such that
w ∈ R(z) \ P(x). Since R(z) ∩ D ⊆ P(y) ∩ D and w ∈ R(z) ∩ D, we have that w ∈ P(y).
Thus, w ∈R(y) \ P(x), as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 22. First we claim that under the assumptions made in the
proposition, (i*) can be stated in the following reduced form: If σ(hx) ∈X , then σ(hx)
is an efficient move for all coalitions S. That is, the condition that σ(hx) must be a
weakly preferred move from x for some coalition S becomes redundant. To see this,
suppose that σ(hx) is not a weakly preferred move from x for any majority coalition S.
Then uS(μ[σ¯(hx)])  uS(x) for all majority coalitions S. Then |{i :ui(μ[σ¯(hx)]) ≥
ui(x)}| < n/2 ≤ |{i :ui(x) > ui(μ[σ¯(hx)])}|. Hence, there is a majority coalition S′ such
that uS′(x) > uS′(μ[σ¯(hx)]). But then σ(hx) is not efficient for S′.
Thus we can conclude that DEPCF* is equivalent to the requirement that σ(hx) ∈
X ∪ {STOP} is an efficient move for all majority coalitions S for all (hx). We claim that
this is equivalent to σ satisfying the one-deviation property. That σ(hx) is efficient
for a majority coalition S is equivalent to uS(μ[σ¯(hxa)]) ≯ uS(μ[σ¯(hx)]) for all a ∈
X ∪ {STOP}. That this holds for all majority coalitions S is equivalent to
∣∣{i :ui(μ[σ¯(hxa)]) > ui(μ[σ¯(hx)])}∣∣< n/2 ≤ ∣∣{i :ui(μ[σ¯(hx)])≥ ui(μ[σ¯(hx)])}∣∣
for all a ∈ X ∪ {STOP}. This, in turn, is equivalent to μ[σ¯(hx)] M μ[σ¯(hxa)] for all
a ∈X ∪ {STOP}, as desired. 
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(ab) S c S¯
(x y) {12} z {13}
(y z) {13} x {23}
(zw) {23} y {12}
(wx) {23} y {12}
(zx) {23} y {12}
(wy) {12} z {13}
Table 1. Construction of DEPCF in Example 21.
A.2 Construction of policy program σC for the model of Bernheim and Slavov (2009)
Construct a partitioning {Hx}x∈C of H as in (4). Let the policy program σC satisfy, for all
h ∈Hx,
σC(h y)=
{
y if y ∈ C \ P(x)
z(x y) if y /∈ C \ P(x).
The only difference between this program and the one defined in (3)–(5) concerns the
choice σC(h y) when y ∈ C \ P(x). Since
σC(h y     y)= y
and
(h y     y) ∈Hy
it follows that the policy program σC is absorbing in a very strong sense: starting from
any history (h y), the program starts repeating the status quo in at most one period
(Bernheim and Slavov 2009 call this property stationarity). By an argument analogous
to that of Lemma 4, this policy program is DCW and has C as the set of absorbing states.
A.3 Construction of a DEPCF in Example 21
We now construct a DEPCF that implements any of the alternatives {x y zw} in Exam-
ple 21. This construction requires that if uS(b) > uS(a) for a majority coalition S, then
there is c and a majority coalition S′ such that uS′(c) > uS′(b) and uS(c)≯ uS(a). Table 1
shows how to choose c and S¯ for each combination of (ab) and S.
We now specify the process of coalition formation (σ I) and a partitioning of the
histories
⋃∞
k=0(X × {majority coalitions})k into phases {HaS}a∈{xyzw} S majority coalition.
The process of coalition formation (σ I) is constructed as follows: If h belongs to the
phase HaS , and the status quo is b, two alternatives exist:
(a) If uS(b)≯ uS(a), then σ(hb)= STOP.
(b) If uS(b) > uS(a), then σ(hb) = c and I(hb) = S¯ such that uS(c) ≯ uS(a) and
uS¯(c) > uS¯(b) (see Table 1).
Phases {HaS}a∈{xyzw} S majority coalition are constructed as follows: If h belongs to the
phase HaS , and the status quo is b, there are three alternatives:
214 Hannu Vartiainen Theoretical Economics 9 (2014)
• If uS(b) ≯ uS(a) and a majority coalition S′ induces a status quo d = STOP, then
(hbS′ d) ∈HbS′ .
• If uS(b) > uS(a) and a majority coalition S¯ induces a status quo d = c, then
(hb S¯ d) ∈HcS¯ (see Table 1).
• In all other cases, the new history remains in the phase HaS .
To see how the constructed DEPCF works, note that at any phase HaS and at any
status quo b, it takes at most two steps for the process to implement an outcome ξ
such that uS(ξ) ≯ uS(a). In particular, if b = a, then a is implemented instantaneously.
Consider the consequences of a deviation. If (a) applies, then a deviation by S′ to
d = STOP results in a phase change to HbS′ and implementation of an outcome ξ such
that uS′(ξ)≯ uS′(b). Without a deviation by S′, b is implemented. Hence, the deviation
is not profitable. If (b) applies, then a deviation by S¯ to d = c results in a phase change to
HcS¯ and implementation of an outcome ξ such that uS¯(ξ)≯ uS¯(c). Without a deviation
by S¯, c becomes implemented. Hence, the deviation is not profitable.
The set of implemented outcomes of this DEPCF is {x y zw}. As argued in Exam-
ple 21, the unique set of the consistent choice set is {x y z}.
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin (2012), “Dynamics and stabil-
ity of constitutions, coalitions, and clubs.” American Economic Review, 102, 1446–1476.
[188, 190]
Anesi, Vincent (2006), “Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of sta-
ble sets.” Social Choice andWelfare, 27, 595–610. [188, 190, 205]
Anesi, Vincent (2010), “Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games.”
Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 488–493. [188, 190, 198, 205]
Anesi, Vincent (2012), “A new old solution for weak tournaments.” Social Choice and
Welfare, 39, 919–930. [188, 190, 198, 205]
Anesi, Vincent and Daniel Seidmann (forthcoming), “Bargaining over an endogenous
agenda.” Theoretical Economics. [188, 189, 190, 198, 205]
Banks, Jeffrey S. (1985), “Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control.” Social
Choice andWelfare, 1, 295–306. [191]
Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn (1989), “Bargaining in legislatures.” American Po-
litical Science Review, 83, 1181–1206. [205]
Bell, Colin E. (1981), “A random voting graph almost surely has a Hamiltonian cycle
when the number of alternatives is large.” Econometrica, 49, 1597–1603. [187]
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Sita N. Slavov (2009), “A solution concept for majority rule in
dynamic settings.” Review of Economic Studies, 76, 33–62. [187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193,
205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 213]
Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) Endogenous agenda formation processes 215
Chwe, Michael S.-Y. (1994), “Farsighted coalitional stability.” Journal of Economic The-
ory, 63, 299–325. [188, 189, 211]
Diermeier, Daniel and Pohan Fong (2012), “Characterization of the von Neumann–
Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a
persistent agenda setter.” Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 349–353. [188, 190]
Duggan, John (2006), “Endogenous voting agendas.” Social Choice and Welfare, 27,
495–530. [188, 191]
Duggan, John (2013), “Uncovered sets.” Social Choice and Welfare, 41, 489–535. [190,
194, 198, 199, 202, 203]
Duggan, John and Jeffrey S. Banks (2008), “A dynamic model of democratic elections in
multidimensional policy spaces.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3, 269–299. [188]
Dutta, Bhaskar (1988), “Covering sets and a new Condorcet correspondence.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 44, 63–80. [189, 190, 202, 203]
Dutta, Bhaskar, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton (2001), “Strategic candidacy
and voting procedures.” Econometrica, 69, 1013–1037. [188, 191]
Dutta, Bhaskar, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton (2002), “Voting by successive
elimination and strategic candidacy.” Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 190–218. [188,
191]
Dutta, Bhaskar, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton (2004), “Equilibrium agenda
formation.” Social Choice andWelfare, 23, 21–57. [188, 191]
Dutta, Bhaskar, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton (2005), “The Banks set and
the uncovered set in budget allocation problems.” In Social Choice and Strategic Deci-
sions (David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, eds.), 163–199, Springer, Berlin. [190]
Fishburn, Peter C. (1977), “Condorcet social choice functions.” SIAM Journal of Applied
Mathematics, 33, 469–489. [189]
Konishi, Hideo and Debraj Ray (2003), “Coalition formation as a dynamic process.” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 110, 1–41. [187, 188, 189, 191, 193, 197, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211]
McKelvey, Richard D. (1979), “General conditions for global intransitivities in formal vot-
ing models.” Econometrica, 47, 1085–1112. [187, 188]
Miller, Nicholas R. (1980), “A new solution set to for tournaments and majority voting:
Further graph-theoretical approaches to the theory of voting.” American Journal of Po-
litical Science, 24, 68–96. [189, 191, 203]
Penn, Elizabeth M. (2006), “Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implica-
tions.” Social Choice andWelfare, 27, 83–87. [188, 190, 202]
Penn, Elizabeth M. (2008), “A distributive n-amendment game with endogenous agenda
formation.” Public Choice, 136, 201–213. [191, 198]
216 Hannu Vartiainen Theoretical Economics 9 (2014)
Penn, Elizabeth M. (2009), “A model of farsighted voting.” American Journal of Political
Science, 53, 36–54. [188]
Ray, Debraj (2007), A Game Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford. [188]
Ray, Debraj and Rajiv Vohra (1997), “Equilibrium binding agreements.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 73, 30–78. [189]
Roberts, Kevin (2007), “Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting.” Social
Choice andWelfare, 29, 383–404. [188]
Rubinstein, Ariel (1979), “A note about the ‘nowhere denseness’ of societies having an
equilibrium under majority rule.” Econometrica, 47, 511–514. [187]
Schofield, Norman (1983), “Generic instability of majority rule.” Review of Economic
Studies, 50, 695–705. [187]
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast (1984), “Uncovered sets and sophisticated
voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” American Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 28, 49–74. [191]
Vartiainen, Hannu (2011), “Dynamic coalitional equilibrium.” Journal of Economic The-
ory, 146, 672–698. [187, 188, 189, 191, 193, 197, 205, 207, 208, 209, 211]
Xue, Licun (1998), “Coalitional stability under perfect foresight.” Economic Theory, 11,
603–627. [188, 209]
Submitted 2012-4-24. Final version accepted 2012-12-10. Available online 2012-12-10.
